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Abstract 
Gas markets based on virtual hubs has been the preferred EU design. Such market designs are based 
on socializing network flexibility services. Nonetheless, shippers have different preferences about the 
network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction 
of auction mechanisms to deal with network service allocation in the short term. The auction aims to 
represent simultaneously the diversity of players’ preferences and the trade-offs implied by network 
constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed. On the one hand, an auction with one product 
allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences. On the other, a multi-
product (gas and line-pack storage) auction is designed to facilitate the revelation of preferences on 
line-pack storage. 
Keywords 
Auction design, gas markets, gas balancing, entry/exit allocation, iterative and combinatorial auctions. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU gas markets have followed the design of the UK gas industry liberalization, where gas 
transactions were organized around the definition of a virtual hub1, Heather (2010). The virtual-hub 
approach implies that the market is using a commercial network for the commodity trade. In this 
context, the standard approach to the definition of the commercial network in the EU is the entry/exit 
regulation, Hunt (2008). In it, market players have the right to inject gas in the system at any entry 
point, and to withdraw gas from any exit point.  
One of the main advantages of the use of a commercial network is that it may increase market 
liquidity through the simplification of the physical network it represents. But it comes at the cost of a 
representation gap between commercial and physical networks. It is thus necessary to transform the 
allocation of the commercial network into gas flows through the physical network. In this view, the 
market design requires a set of additional elements that bridge the gap between commercial and 
physical networks, which are usually grouped under the header of balancing mechanisms.  
Vazquez & Hallack (2012) show that some of the rules adopted in European markets lead to 
inefficient allocation of the network capacity in the short term. On the one hand, entry/exit capacity 
allocation implies that the system operator must estimate the future use of the network. Hence, 
ensuring that the capacity sold will be actually available necessarily results in selling less capacity 
than the network physical capacity. On the other hand, line-pack is rarely sold to market participants, 
but instead it is a tool used by TSOs to run balancing mechanisms. Therefore, there are inefficiencies 
in the line-pack socialization implicit in the balancing systems. So the EU gas systems typically face a 
dilemma between socializing the line-pack (e. g. daily balancing mechanisms) or not using the line-
pack (e. g. hourly balancing mechanisms), Lapuerta (2003). 
We propose the use of auctions to cope with some of the challenges implicit in virtual-hub 
regulation, and to shed light on the balancing time structure dilemma (daily versus hourly). We will 
pursue the strategy of separating the services that are currently managed by the balancing mechanisms 
into two different types: the services required for the short-term adjustment of players’ portfolio (and 
thus allocated through market mechanisms), and the services required for ensuring the system security 
(and thus part of the balancing mechanism). We will use the results obtained in Vazquez & Hallack 
(2012) to identify the services required to be included in the market mechanism. Specifically, the two 
main challenges of virtual-hub regulation have to do with the socialization of network flexibility2, in 
terms of spatial and temporal flexibility. Hence, the auction should allocate such network flexibility 
according to market preferences. The remaining network services (the ones needed to guarantee the 
system security) will continue to be part of the TSO’s balancing actions and it will be mainly 
socialized among all the systems’ users.  
To include the shippers’ preferences for time and spatial flexibility, the market mechanisms 
proposed in this paper include locational signals for the allocation of transmission capacity, and inter-
temporal signals for the allocation of line-pack storage. In this view, the typical mechanism used to 
coordinate the information of a TSO and the decision-making process of market players is the auction. 
Such auction will consist in the TSO defining the offer of network services, and market players 
deciding on their bids according to their need of such services. We propose two possibilities for the 
                                                     
1 The virtual hub is not a physical junction of pipelines, but instead a standard set of delivery points with a simplified 
representation of the physical characteristics of the network. 
2 We follow Hallack (2011) in defining flexibility services as the ability to “wait and see”. In this way, time flexibility is 
defined as the ability to “wait and see”, before deciding on when gas will be injected or/and withdrawn. Spatial flexibility 
also accommodates to the idea of “wait and see”: the flexible shipper can wait and see before deciding on where the gas 
will be injected or/and withdrawn. 
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design of the auction for short-term gas markets: Our first proposal builds on the idea that market 
players need only to know their preferences for injections and withdrawals from the system. The 
implicit allocation of network services with respect to gas prices allows them to avoid calculations of 
the possible values of network services. The players will bid for injections and withdrawals of gas, 
specifying the hour of the day and their location in the network. The auction will be based on a 
clearing algorithm that represent approximately the network operation, and decides the allocation of 
network services according to players’ bids. Such clearing algorithm will be a multi-period 
optimization, with hourly granularity, taking account of transmission and line-pack representation. 
Nonetheless, the representation of the optionality associated with line-pack storage by means of gas 
injections and withdrawals is not straightforward; our second proposal is aimed at considering that by 
allowing players to bid for the option (but not the obligation) to have different injections and 
withdrawals at the end of each hour. This is done by reducing the multi-period optimization of the 
previous design to a single-period one, so that the auctioneer decides on the gas flows in order to 
maximize the social surplus.  
In that view, this paper shows two possibilities to improve the efficiency of transmission network 
allocation. In a context of highly valuable line-pack storage, how to use the network (whether to use 
networks for gas transmission or for line-pack storage) becomes a key decision and such choice needs 
to be driven by players’ preferences. The main differences between the two proposals stem from that 
way in which they consider the optionality associated with line-pack storage. In the first auction, the 
injection and withdrawals do not need to be the same for each player in each hour. But all injections 
and withdrawals are established in the clearing of the auction3. In the second auction, there is a service 
that gives the option to withdraw gas at different points in time4. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the challenges faced by 
virtual-hub regulation, in order to motivate the auction mechanism. Section 3 describes the general 
scheme for the short-term gas market after the introduction of network service allocation through the 
auction mechanism. Section 4 defines the single-product auction, based only on gas commodity bids. 
Section 5 presents the multi-product auction, which includes the explicit representation of the line-
pack storage. Section 6 compares the two proposals and discusses on further issues in the design of 
short-term gas markets. Finally section 7 collects our conclusions. 
2. The role played by balancing mechanisms in EU gas markets 
The main consequence of using virtual hubs is the fact that the physical representation of the network 
is not available to market participants, so they must address two special issues: the way in which the 
transmission capacity is allocated to market players, and the way in which the actual technical 
characteristics of the gas network are finally dealt with.  
2.1 Entry/exit capacity allocation 
Virtual hubs are designed to reduce network assets specificity, and thus transaction costs, by 
disregarding several physical characteristics of the network. As a part of such design, the network 
capacity and the gas are sold separately. But as virtual hubs disregard the physical representation of 
the network, the allocation of the network does not correspond to the real physical flows.  
                                                     
3 The shipper can withdraw gas in a certain hour or withdraw it afterwards. But she cannot withdraw it at any time, it is a 
firm contract for withdrawing gas. 
4 If the player withdrew gas in a certain hour, and purchased the associated line-pack service, the shipper can inject it in 
such hour or later on. 
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The solution adopted by EU gas markets is to define the capacity to enter and exit the system. 
Shippers need only to define their needs for entry and exit capacity. They first purchase the right to 
enter (or exit) the market, and then they are allowed to trade without capacity constraints. Besides, 
entry and exit capacity are allocated separately, in order to keep asset specificity low (i.e. shippers do 
not need to purchase entry and exit capacity at the same time).  
In markets with entry/exit capacity allocation, the TSO must define in advance the transmission 
capacity that will be made available for shippers, see for instance Lapuerta & Moselle (2002). 
Vazquez, Hallack & Glachant (2012) show that this allocation procedure leads in general to 
constraints on the way in which market players may use transmission networks. As entry and exit 
capacity is allocated before the trades take place, the capacity calculation is made with estimation of 
the future gas flows, and thus the network capacity cannot be allocated according to actual market 
preferences5. 
2.2 The line-pack dilemma 
The central idea behind simplifying the network to reduce transaction costs is to socialize some of the 
transmission services in order to reduce their asset specificity. The underpinning for this regulatory 
strategy may be thought as benefitting from the fact that some services have approximately the same 
value for all network users. In this view, removing those services from the market and socializing 
them implies little inefficiency, while it significantly reduces the specificity of transmission services. 
However, a central condition to pursue this strategy is the condition that the services have 
approximately the same value for all users. Whether this condition is fulfilled markedly depends on 
the particular characteristics of each system.  
The choice of a daily gas balancing mechanism was conceived to provide shippers with enough 
time flexibility in a context of homogeneous flow patterns. However, it may be not approximate 
enough in a context of increased heterogeneity of flow patterns Keyaerts, Hallack, Glachant & 
D'haeseleer (2011). These heterogeneous patterns are currently found in most gas markets in Europe, 
because of the high consumption of gas-fired power plants or of supply from LNG sources, see for 
instance Honore (2011) or Hallack (2011)6. Consequently, with the current characteristics of EU gas 
flows, the inefficiencies associated with the socialization of line-pack services may likely outweigh the 
benefits of the asset specificity reduction of such socialization.  
Currently, as shown in Vazquez, Hallack & Glachant (2012), balancing mechanisms face the 
dilemma of choosing between a daily balancing mechanism and an hourly balancing mechanism. 
Daily balancing mechanisms imply free time flexibility within the day. As the line-pack is allocated 
for free, all players may use the balancing to adjust freely their portfolios. However, it has an 
economic value for shippers who need flexibility to balance their portfolios. On the one hand, when 
the network must be balanced on a daily basis, there are cross-subsidies between flat and flexible 
patterns. On the other, there are few (or no) incentives to develop other mechanisms to hedge shippers’ 
imbalances within the day. Thus, in addition to cross-subsidization, there is non-market competition 
between free line-pack storage and other flexibility services, such as hourly storage or regasification 
facilities.  
                                                     
5 Consider for example two pipelines connecting a certain entry point A to two different consumption points, B and C; 
each pipeline has a maximum capacity of 100 MW, so that the physical capacity to carry gas to point A is 200 MW. 
However, in an entry/exit scheme, injections at point A have the right to sell either to B or to C. That is, injections at A 
have the right of using both pipelines at the same time. Therefore, the firm capacity at point A is only 100 MW. Spatial 
flexibility, in this case, is a substitute of gas trading, as the remaining 100 MW will be allocated by means of TSO’s 
actions. 
6 Moreover, the increase insertion of wind generation in the electricity portfolio drove the growth of amount of flexibility 
provided by gas to the electricity system and as consequence it increased the costs of the flexible use of the gas network 
Keyaerts, Rombaults, Delarue & D'haeseleer (2011).  
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In the hourly balancing mechanism shippers are required to be balanced at the end of each hour. 
Hence, line-pack flexibility is allocated only within the hour, so players cannot use line-pack storage 
to adjust demand and supply in different hours within a day. Put it differently, the system will be 
allocating less network services than the physical ones, as shippers are prevented to use line-pack 
storage for adjustment. This option becomes more problematic with the increased needs for within-day 
flexibility demanded by gas-fired power plants (particularly in the context of increasing participation 
of intermittent generation). In order to provide shippers with the complete flexibility of the system, the 
EU choice is to rely on daily balancing mechanisms, ACER (2011).  
3. Auctions as tools to improve network services allocation  
In the current EU regulation, the TSO becomes the main provider of flexibility within the day. On the 
one hand, within-day flexibility is valuable service. However, if this service is provided without the 
adapted economic signals, it can interfere with the incentives for network capacity allocation. The 
strategy that we pursue to improve the short-term allocation of network resources is to identify two 
kinds of imbalances in the short-term operation of gas system. 
The first kind of imbalance may arise when shippers may deviate from their positions resulting 
from previous long-term contracts. These deviations may often be anticipated by shippers. Shippers 
may also anticipate that along the day they will have some variation following a known profile (for 
instance, they will consume more in the morning). Shippers may also anticipate some volatility in their 
consumption, i.e., demand may deviate but they cannot anticipate the amplitude and pattern of such 
deviations Graves & Levine (2010). A typical example is a shipper purchasing gas for the 
consumption of a CCGT. Such shipper may know day-ahead when it will be dispatched and its 
production profile over the day. Furthermore, if the power plant produces in the within-day market (or 
in the electricity balancing market), it is not possible to anticipate its gas consumption. But it is 
possible to anticipate the volatility of such consumption. In that view, line-pack storage, as any other 
storage tool, can be used to deal with profiles variation or to hedge shippers’ consumption.  
The second kind of imbalance comes from close-to-real-time events, such as the sudden disruption 
of some injection source (like wind or solar production patterns), which are difficult to anticipate and 
hence to coordinate around market arrangements. Such very-short-term events (within the hour) would 
be left under the responsibility of the system operator. Since the network is a public good, sharing the 
cost among consumers is an efficient allocation mechanism.  
From that standpoint, many of the arrangements that take place in current balancing mechanisms, 
and thus under the responsibility of the TSO, have to do with the adjustment of shippers’ portfolio. 
And the shippers’ adjustments are suitable for market mechanisms. Thus, auctions seem to be a useful 
tool to allow shippers to reveal their preferences. The requirement for a market-based, short-term 
mechanism is that it is capable of allocating both transmission capacity and line-pack storage. 
3.1 Inter-dependency of line-pack storage and transmission capacity 
In order to design an auction, the first step is to define the services that will be auctioned. Ideally, the 
short-term market would allocate separately line-pack services, transmission capacity and gas 
commodity, possibly by means of three independent auctions. However, these three products are inter-
dependent, and hence it is relevant to allow players to express their preferences on the relationship 
among them. The direct way to do this is to allocate the three products in a single auction.  
3.1.1 Dealing with spatial flexibility 
The main challenges of entry/exit capacity allocation may be identified with the fact that it separates 
entry and exit allocation. This implies the cross-subsidization of shippers with needs for spatial 
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flexibility, and leaves the TSO with significant uncertainty about the real paths that the gas will follow 
internally. Put it differently, as shippers cannot reveal their spatial preferences, the TSO does not have 
the required information to allocate network capacity. To cope with the problem, we propose to rely 
on the joint allocation of entry and exit capacity in the short term. Shippers’ bids will contain, 
explicitly or implicitly, the paths that they intend to follow for their gas trades. In this view, instead of 
allocating entry capacity, the market will manage bids for enter the system to sell gas in a specific exit 
point. In other words, market players do not buy the right to enter the system, but the right to enter the 
system and to sell gas in a specific location. 
3.1.2 Dealing with time flexibility 
The TSO must bridge the gap between commercial and physical networks without enough information 
about shippers’ preferences on the timing of injections and withdrawals. In the current approach, when 
there are differences between the time of injections and withdrawals, the TSO must use line-pack 
storage to adjust them. Moreover, the TSOs must decide on the trade-off between line-pack storage 
and transmission capacity without market signals, as there is not a place for market players to reveal 
their preferences on line-pack storage. We propose two different solutions for the line-pack allocation. 
In the auction design 1, it is possible to determine the market preferences from the bids made by 
market players in the short-term auction. To do so, the auctioneer will use an algorithm to minimize 
the differential of gas prices through the day’s hours and the network points. Hence, the TSO decides 
on network services, both transmission capacity and line-pack storage, in order to obtain the maximum 
surplus. In this view, the line-pack could be used to match, for example, a cheap injection bid at a 
certain hour and an expensive withdrawal bid several hours later. Under this scheme, shippers need 
only to decide on their gas injections and withdrawals, and the network services (transmission and 
line-pack) are allocated through the auction clearing.  
In the auction design 2, two products are auctioned: the gas in each hour and the line-pack in each 
hour. There are two main differences between this auction and the previous one. First, in the auction 
design 2, the amount of line-pack allocated is explicitly defined by shippers (and not as a result of the 
algorithm). Second, players in auction 2 will be revealing preferences on the optionality to inject or 
withdraw gas. The line-pack services can be accumulated, and thus the shipper can inject or withdraw 
gas at any hour, as long as she is hedged by line-packs services.  
3.2 Auctions and the sequence of allocation mechanisms 
The general criterion that we use is that some of the physical characteristics of the transmission 
network will be ultimately deal with by the TSO. The logic for that can be traced to the idea that some 
of the original asset specificity is inescapable, and must be managed by the operator(s) of the 
network7. As the asset is highly specific, the set of contracts will never be complete ex ante. We will 
group the set of services managed by the system operator(s) under the header of ancillary services. 
This can be alternatively thought of as the activity of bridging the gap between commercial and 
physical networks. 
To design an efficient mechanism for the short-term allocation of network services, one needs to 
take account of the three inter-dependent products that are actually traded in the short run. First, gas 
supply and demand may be used to manage imbalances in the short term. Second, line-pack, 
analogously to other storage facilities, is an effective tool to manage imbalances, especially when the 
demand pattern is strongly time varying. Third, buying and selling gas at different points of the 
entry/exit system represents an additional option available for shippers in the balancing mechanism.  
                                                     
7 Note that this is the case even in systems where network activities are liberalized, as the US sector. 
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The allocation of the three products implies a complex interaction between market decisions and 
TSOs. In order to facilitate such coordination, this paper proposes the use of short-term auctions. 
Nonetheless, after the auction, players should be allowed to renegotiate their contracts. Hence, the 
auction designs take into account the shippers’ capacity to trade gas in the within-day markets. 
Furthermore, there is an essential role to be played by Transmission System Operators (TSO), and 
some tools must be left under their responsibility, so that they may ensure the security of the system. 
In any case, the contracts resulting from the auction will be firm, to ensure incentive compatibility in 
the auction. This in turn implies the design of a gate closure for within-day trading in a format well 
known in the electricity market.  
4. Single-product, combinatorial auctions to allocate network services (Auction design 1) 
A first alternative is to choose the gas commodity as the driver for the allocation of all network 
services. The main idea behind this option is that shippers just bid on the price of gas that will be 
injected and withdrawn from all entry and exit points over a certain time period. Once those decisions 
are taken, the clearing of the auction determines the flows through the network and the line-pack 
storage, in order to minimize price differences among entry and exit points.  
Consider first that the gas system has no possibility to store gas inside the pipelines. In that case, 
the temporal dimension of the allocation process disappears, and the only service to be allocated by 
the auction is the transmission capacity. The option chosen means that transmission capacity will be 
allocated implicitly in the gas prices at each entry/exit point, in order to minimize the differences of 
gas prices among the entry/exit points at a certain point in time. This problem, which does not take 
into account the line-pack flexibility, is close to the spirit of zonal pricing in electricity auctions 
Schweppe, Caramanis, Tabors & Bohn (1988). However, compared to electricity auctions, zonal 
pricing in gas networks face the additional difficulty, from the design point of view, that there is an 
additional degree of freedom: the line pack storage ability of the transmission network under use for 
transmitting gas.  
But in any case, it would be possible to use the model for the optimization of gas flows as the 
clearing algorithm of such auction. Under this frame, shippers would submit bids consisting in the 
quantity of gas that they are willing to sell or buy at each entry/exit point, and the corresponding 
prices. The Transmission System Operator (or in general the auctioneer in charge of the short-term 
auction) would receive the bids, and would decide on the flows and line-pack in order to minimize 
price differences. This first alternative is intended to mimic the bidding process of zonal pricing in 
electricity markets. In gas systems, however, one needs to allocate, in addition to transmission 
capacity, line-pack services.  
4.1 A proposal for the clearing model in an implicit auction 
The algorithm for an implicit gas auction that takes into account the line-pack is close to the reasoning 
of combinatorial auctions for electricity markets, which are based on using unit-commitment models 
to clear the market, Hobbs, Rothkopf, O'Neill & Chao (2001). The logic for the application to short-
term gas markets is to represent, by means of a simplified model of the operation of the gas network, 
the optimal allocation of gas flows and line-pack storage implicit in the players’ bids for the gas 
commodity. 
In that view, the objective function of the optimization of the network services will be to maximize 
the social benefit. In this case, it will be represented by the maximum of values of bids for injection 
minus values of the bids for withdrawal over the auction horizon.  
Consider a certain system made up of 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁 entry/exit points and 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑀 pipelines. Let 
us denote: 
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• 𝐼𝑡 = �𝐼𝑡1⋮
𝐼𝑡
𝑁
� is the vector of injections at each entry/exit point at time 𝑡 
• 𝐵𝑡 �𝐼𝑡 � = � 𝐵𝑡1(𝐼𝑡1)⋮
𝐵𝑡
𝑁(𝐼𝑡𝑁)� is the vector of bids for injections at each entry/exit point at 
time 𝑡 
• 𝑊𝑡 = �𝑊𝑡1⋮
𝑊𝑡
𝑁
� is the vector of withdrawals at each entry/exit point at time 𝑡 
• 𝐶𝑡 �𝑊𝑡 � = � 𝐶𝑡1(𝑊𝑡1)⋮
𝐶𝑡
𝑁(𝑊𝑡𝑁)� is the vector of bids for withdrawals at each entry/exit 
point at time 𝑡 
• 𝑓𝑡 = �𝑓𝑡1⋮
𝑓𝑡
𝑀
� is the vector of flows through each pipeline of the system at time 𝑡 
• 𝑙𝑡 = � 𝑙𝑡1⋮
𝑙𝑡
𝑀
� is the vector of line-pack storage in each pipeline at time 𝑡 
• ℳ is the incidence matrix: its element ℳ𝑖𝑖  is 1 if the line 𝑗 is leaving the 
entry/exit point 𝑖, -1 if the pipeline is arriving at the point, and zero otherwise.  
• ℱ𝑓  is the matrix relating flows through the pipeline and pressure differential 
• ℱ𝑙  is the matrix relating line-pack storage inside the pipeline and pressure 
differential 
• 𝑝𝑡 = �𝑝𝑡1⋮
𝑝𝑡
𝑁
� is the vector of pressures at each entry/exit point at time 𝑡 
The system constraints that we will be considering are: 
• The energy balance at each entry/exit point 
𝑙𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 −𝑊𝑡 + ℳ𝑓𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡−1 
• The flow and line-pack definition in terms of nodes’ pressure 
𝑓𝑡 = ℱ𝑓 𝑝𝑡  
𝑙𝑡 = ℱ𝑙 𝑝𝑡  
• The pressure limits of the pipelines 
𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑝𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝑚 
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With the previous notation, the total social surplus can be written as ∑ �𝐵𝑡 �𝐼𝑡 � − 𝐶𝑡 �𝑊𝑡 ��𝑡 . 
Therefore, the clearing algorithm can be represented by  
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐼𝑡 ,𝑊𝑡 ,𝑓𝑡 ,𝑙𝑡 ,𝑝𝑡 ∑ �𝐵𝑡 �𝐼𝑡 � − 𝐶𝑡 �𝑊𝑡 ��𝑡
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑙𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 −𝑊𝑡 + ℳ𝑓𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡−1 :𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑡 = ℱ𝑓 𝑝𝑡 :𝜇𝑡𝐹
𝑙𝑡 = ℱ𝑙 𝑝𝑡 :𝜇𝑡𝐿
𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑝𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝑚 :𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑚, 𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚
 (1) 
This formulation purposely simplifies significantly the laws governing the flows through a gas 
network (see for instance Mokhatab, Poe & Speight (2006) for detailed representations). The idea is 
that the auction mechanism is not intended to represent in detail physical flows, but to separate the 
network services required to adjust shippers’ portfolios from the complex technical characteristics that 
will be managed by the TSO. This should not be surprising, as it is the same strategy pursued by unit-
commitment models for electricity markets. Again, the institutional choices in the EU gas systems 
have reduced markedly the economic differences between power and gas networks. 
The optimality conditions for the previous program yields 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝐼𝑡 : 𝜕𝐵𝑡 �𝐼𝑡 �
𝜕𝐼𝑡
= 𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑊𝑡 : 𝜕𝐶𝑡 �𝑊𝑡 �
𝜕𝑊𝑡
= 𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 
These two equations just assert that the price is the one that makes the marginal utility of injections 
equal to the marginal utility of withdrawals. 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑙𝑡 : 𝜇𝑡+1𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 − 𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡𝐿 = 0 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑓𝑡 : ℳ𝑇𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 − 𝜇𝑡𝐹 = 0 
These two equations give the value of the transmission and the line-pack storage along the whole 
network. The former is expressed by means of the price differences among the nodes of the network at 
a certain point in time, and the latter is expressed by the price difference between two consecutive 
periods of each node of the network. 
Finally, pressures optimality gives the relationship between line-pack and transmission.  
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑝𝑡 : ℱ𝑓𝑇𝜇𝑡𝐹 + ℱ𝑙𝑇𝜇𝑡𝐿 + �𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑚� = 0 
The last optimality condition gives the relationship between transmission and line-pack storage. Both 
services are related by means of the pressure differential of the pipeline. 
4.1.1 Line-pack pricing 
Consider that we do not have congestion, so 
ℱ𝑓
𝑇𝜇𝑡
𝐹 = −ℱ𝑙𝑇𝜇𝑡𝐿 
Therefore, in terms of node prices, we have that 
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 ℱ𝑓
𝑇ℳ𝑇𝜇𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 = ℱ𝑙𝑇�𝜇𝑡+1𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 − 𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝� 
The left-hand side of the equation represents the value of transmission along the network. It is 
representing the comparison among the price differences in the pipelines (and hence the value of 
transmission) at each node of the network. The right-hand side of the equation gives the value of the 
line-pack. It compares, at each node of the network, the price differences between the present period 
and the next period (the value of line-pack). In this view, the right-hand side of the equation is the 
analogue of the right-hand side, but instead of looking at the price differences among the nodes, it 
looks at the differences among prices in the next period.  
Therefore, the algorithm clears the auction in order to make the marginal utility of transmission 
equal to the marginal utility of line-pack. Such marginal utilities are represented by offers of gas 
injections and withdrawals. 
4.1.2 Bidding for line-pack storage 
From the viewpoint of players’ bids, the choice between line-pack and transmission is done implicitly 
in their offers for gas commodity injections and withdrawals in the different hours of a day. It is 
worthy to note that the line-pack is allocated according to the results of the interaction of shippers 
bids. The line-pack is not allocated to any individual shipper but as result of the pricing differences in 
the day’s hours.  
As result, on one hand, the capacity is efficiently allocated according to the preferences of the 
shippers in the moment that the auctions were completed. On the other hand, in case of changes in the 
shippers’ preferences, the capacity could be re-allocated through a secondary market. Thus, the line-
pack is allocated, but the players’ flexibility (wait and see) to change their positions regarding the 
movement of injections and withdrawals is let to the secondary market.  
4.2 The combinatorial auction 
In principle, the auction would have the same time scope as the previous balancing mechanisms, as it 
is intended to play the same role as the balancing mechanism. In fact, a sensible time scope for the 
auction is a day, as network line-pack will be used largely by gas-fired power plants (GFPP), so it is 
sensible to facilitate the operations by making both time scopes coordinated. 
The mechanism proposed in this section consists in a combinatorial auction where shippers decide 
on their bids for gas injection and withdrawal at each entry/exit point and each hour of the gas day. 
The auctioneer receives the bids, and uses the algorithm described above to clear the market. In doing 
so, the auctioneer determines the winning bids and the price for the gas commodity at each entry/exit 
point at each hour of the gas day. Transmission capacity and line-pack storage are thus allocated 
implicitly by the market clearing. 
5. Sealed-bid auctions with explicit line-pack contracting (Auction design 2) 
The previous auction design is based on a multi-period optimization, aimed at deciding on the trade-
off between transmission capacity and line-pack storage over the gas day. However, in order to design 
their bids, market players must calculate what will be the preferences of the rest of shippers in the 
auction. 
To facilitate this process, a useful solution is make line-pack explicit. The main idea is to consider 
separately the line-pack rights. Under this design, the short-term auction would allocate two products: 
 The gas commodity at each entry/exit point 
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 The right to have an imbalanced portfolio in two consecutive hours 
As in the previous option (auction design 1), the transmission rights would be allocated implicitly in 
the gas commodity prices. With this auction design (2), we transform the multi-period optimization of 
the previous alternative in a single-period optimization. In addition, shippers are now able to express 
their preferences on line-pack storage, instead of having to internalize them in the bids of injections 
and withdrawals. The potential problem would be that shippers must decide on a wider range of 
contracts, and thus the associated transaction costs would increase. In our opinion, compared to the 
increase of efficiency in the use of the network, this effect is negligible. 
Shippers would be bidding for gas commodity and line-pack. Hence, there is no degree of freedom 
for the clearing algorithm. Given the gas injections and withdrawals at each hour of the auction 
horizon, and the line-pack requirements, the only free variable for the Transmission System Operator 
to decide on is the gas flow at each hour. In doing so, the clearing algorithm is now essentially the 
same as zonal pricing of power networks. 
5.1 Calculating the relationship between line-pack and transmission capacity 
The optimization program is the single-period version of the previous alternative: 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐼𝑡 ,𝑊𝑡 ,𝑓𝑡 ,𝐿𝑡 ,𝑝𝑡 𝐵𝑡 �𝐼𝑡 � − 𝐶𝑡 �𝑊𝑡 � + 𝐷𝑡 �𝐿𝑡 �
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐿𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 −𝑊𝑡 + ℳ𝑓𝑡 + 𝐿𝑡−1∗ :𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑡 = ℱ𝑓 𝑝𝑡 :𝜇𝑡𝐹
𝐿𝑡 = ℱ𝑙 𝑝𝑡 :𝜇𝑡𝐿
𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑝𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝑚 :𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑚, 𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚
 (2) 
This is the clearing algorithm. The auctioneer knows at the beginning of the auction the line-pack 
cleared in the previous hour, 𝐿𝑡−1. She also receives bids for injections and withdrawals, 𝐵𝑡 �𝐼𝑡 � and 
𝐶𝑡 �𝑊𝑡 �, and bids for line-pack storage in the hour, 𝐷𝑡 �𝐿𝑡 �. Bids for gas injection and withdrawal 
are cleared according to 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝐼𝑡 : 𝜕𝐵𝑡 �𝐼𝑡 �
𝜕𝐼𝑡
= 𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝  
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑊𝑡 : 𝜕𝐶𝑡 �𝑊𝑡 �
𝜕𝑊𝑡
= 𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 
This optimality condition states that the last bid cleared for line-pack storage will be the one with the 
gas price plus the costs of the transmission that is given up to provide the flexibility service.  
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑙𝑡 : 𝜕𝐷𝑡 �Lt �
𝜕Lt − 𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡𝐿 = 0 
Note that, as 𝐿𝑡−1 is not a decision variable of the algorithm (it is decided in the previous hour 
optimization problem, see problem 2), the relationship with the previous hour is decided on by market 
players through the bids 𝐷𝑡 . 
The two remaining equations express such relationship. 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑓𝑡 : ℳ𝑇𝜇𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝 − 𝜇𝑡𝐹 = 0 
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Finally, pressures optimality gives the relationship between line-pack and transmission.  
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑂 𝑝𝑡 : ℱ𝑓𝑇𝜇𝑡𝐹 + ℱ𝑙𝑇𝜇𝑡𝐿 + �𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝜇𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑚� = 0 
With this option, the line-pack is defined by the bids of market players, not by the market clearing 
process. Consequently, the network resources are allocated regarding shippers preferences on natural 
gas supply and offer (time and place) and also in line-pack storage services. 
6. Revenue properties, risk bearing and the sequence of markets 
The allocation of products in both auctions is not exactly the same. In the auction design 1 the line-
pack storage is used to adapt efficiently the existent capacity to profiles varying hour by hour. It 
increases the efficiency of network allocation by revealing the hourly preferences and allocating cost 
and incentives of network restrictions. It takes into account the capacity of the pipelines to store gas. 
The decision of line-pack storage is based on the aggregate flows optimization and it guarantees the 
optimum use of network in the whole day based on day-ahead preferences.  
The line-pack storage in the auction design 1 is completely allocated to smooth the demand 
variations through the day. However, if the shippers have some (unforeseen) flows shift after the 
auction they need to rely in the within-day market and possible derivative products, Graves & Levine 
(2010).  
The auction design 2, selling explicit line-pack services, provides an additional service which is the 
shippers hedging against the need for within-day trading in case of volatility. The line-pack services 
work as option of selling (or buying) gas in each hour. In this scheme, the auction is selling line-pack 
as hedge service to face daily volatility in demand. The shippers keep an amount of capacity in case 
they need it. In the auction, shippers will thus bid for gas prices and for a complement service of 
flexible injection (or withdrawal). This service can have a key value for high volatile demand, 
especially in the absence of complementary financial services offering hedge, or of a liquid and 
reliable within-day market. On the other hand, as the shipper will buy the line-pack service for having 
the individual right to choose when they will use the network as transport or as line-pack, it may 
happen that the option is not exercised. The line-pack service, being a right and not an obligation, may 
result in a network capacity that is not completely used in the short term. 
If the shippers are able to trade in a liquid within-day market to allocate volatilities and preference 
changes, the two auctions will be equivalent. Under the hypothesis of efficient within-day markets, 
total payments (taking into account all markets and auctions) will be the same under both designs. The 
network will be remunerated equivalently, and the transactions in the secondary market will just 
reallocate resources among shippers. As the hedge trading is only related to re-distribution of risks, its 
total payment would be zero.  
The line-pack storage is allocated for different purposes in the two auctions and the efficiency of 
using one or the other mechanism depends on the complementary markets. In the case where the 
within-day market is well-developed and the shippers may deal with the volatility through trade of 
hedge products, the first auction design seems to be a better option.  
The first option guarantees an efficient use of the resource and there is a low transaction costs as 
just one product is traded. In the case where there is not a developed market of hedge products, the use 
of line-pack services to face volatility seems to be a valuable service. The second option allocates 
storage flexibility according to the economic preferences of shippers and the costs of the system. As 
consequence the allocation of flexibility reveals the information about the shippers’ preferences 
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willingness to pay for flexible services. As consequence, there is not market distortion in the flexibility 
market and also give incentives for the needs of future investment8.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper has shown how a day-ahead auction that takes into account gas prices and network 
capacity, could improve the efficiency of the short-term allocation of the network resources. We 
propose two different auctions. The first one allocates the whole network resources according to gas 
prices. The second one allocates the network resources according to gas prices and their preferences 
on the right to use line-pack. In that view, we propose two different auctions models to improve the 
current network allocation mechanism. In the first auction design, we consider the line-pack storage as 
an instrument to arbitrage gas prices away, and thus we allocate the resource through a daily network 
optimization. In the second auction design, we consider the line-pack storage as a shippers’ tool to 
hedge volatility. And thus the line-pack storage is explicit allocated by shippers’ preferences based on 
the bid price in the auction. 
Of course, the allocation of products in both auctions would be the same, under the hypothesis of 
perfect within-day markets. In the auction design 1 the line-pack storage is better adapted to deal with 
profiles varying on an hourly basis. And it is the most efficient solution in the presence of extremely 
liquid within-day markets, where shippers could hedge against all within-day volatility.  
The auction design 2, including a new service in the auction, the line-pack service, actually offers a 
hedge service. However, whether there is not a within-day market able to reallocate the resources this 
auction do not guarantee the full use of the network, but the guarantee that the resources is used to 
offer the services according to players preferences.  
As the main difference between the two auctions is the explicit allocation of the optionality 
associated with line-pack storage, design 1 (without explicit allocation of optionality) will be adequate 
in markets where within-day trading is expected to be liquid. Otherwise, the hedge provided by the 
line-pack contract in design 2 will be difficult to replicate, and hence will be preferred.  
The paper has not tackled the discussion on the choice between combinatorial and sequential 
auctions. Regardless the auction design is design 1 or design 2, there are potential benefits in using a 
sequence of simple auctions to clear the short-term market (along the lines of European power 
markets), but such choice is not analyzed in the paper.  
Lastly, we want to emphasize that the worth of the proposed solution increases in a context where 
network flexibility becomes a valuable resource in the energy market and thus, the distortion caused 
by misallocation of resources may generate important economic inefficiencies.  
                                                     
8 The impact of the better allocation of the network resources in non-regulated markets as storage and LNG regasification 
capacity should be further study and it is not discussed on this paper. 
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